extraordinary growth during the financial crisis have usually come hand in hand with remarkably high jobless rates, which raises a more general question: beyond the 2008 crisis, do bad economic conditions positively affect support for RLPs?
Despite it being one of the most studied topics in political science, the relationship between the economy and the vote has not produced clear and uncontestable evidence so far (Kriesi 2012) . It is fair to say that the evidence regarding the individual-level effect of economic changes on incumbent punishment and reward seems robust (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008) . However, the extent to which economic voting prevails has been shown to be varying and conditional (van der Brug et al. 2007; Duch and Stevenson 2008) , and research into the kind of parties that voters decide to support when dissatisfied with the incumbent's economic performance is far from exhaustive (Kriesi 2012: 519) . Moreover, while the effect of economic conditions has been clearly theorized for mainstream parties, little is still known about how non-mainstream parties might be affected by them. The literature on Green and radical right parties is inconclusive, with many studies showing economic conditions to exert a very limited impact on these parties' electoral success (Arzheimer 2017 , Müller-Rommel 1998 . On the other hand, research on the effect of economic conditions on the radical left's vote is certainly very scarce.
This article contributes to this area of research by focusing on whether, and under which conditions, the electoral support of RLPs in Europe is affected by the evolution of the national economy. We therefore address the following research questions: To what extent does the economy affect the radical left's electoral support? And how is that influence exerted? We contend that there are good reasons to think RLPs may benefit from bad economic conditions. Unlike other non-mainstream parties, economic issues such as unemployment and redistribution are at the very heart of RLPs' discourse. We therefore argue that bad economic conditions, and particularly increases in unemployment, create a favorable context for these parties to attract more voters. In addition, we hypothesize that the effect of unemployment might be mediated by other factors such as voters' left-right ideological position and whether the mainstream left held office before the election. Our findings show that rising unemployment is associated with a higher probability to vote for RLPs, but that this probability increases at a similar rate for all types of voters irrespectively of their ideological leaning. Moreover, we do not find government composition to play an important role in determining the effect of unemployment on RLPs' vote. March and Rommerskirchen (2015) , and Hernández and Kriesi (2015) rely on aggregate data. Grittersová et al. (2016) also use aggregate data and focus on the effect of austerity policies on niche parties' support, but some of their analyses show a positive effect of unemployment (which they introduce as a control variable) on support for what they call "left niche" parties.
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the literature and develop our working hypotheses. The data and methods employed in the analysis are then introduced in section three, and results are presented in section four. Finally, the concluding section discusses the implications of our findings.
The electoral effects of economic factors
In its most widely accepted formulation, economic voting theory states that the state of the economy affects the electoral support for incumbent parties, and that government parties are punished for negative economic outcomes and rewarded for positive performance (see, among many others, Kramer 1971 , Fiorina 1981 , LewisBeck 1988 , Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000 , Duch and Stevenson 2008 . By focusing on the incumbent's fate, many economic voting models have overlooked the fact that once voters have decided to punish the government, they must make up their minds regarding which opposition party they will support with their vote -if they decide to turn out at all (Kriesi 2012) . It has been argued that perceived economic policy competence may grant opposition parties the ability to capture groups of voters dissatisfied with the incumbent's performance Stevenson 2008, Bélanger and Nadeau 2014) . Voters may then use elections as both sanctioning mechanisms for bad economic performance and selection mechanisms to choose the 'good economic types' (Banks and Sundaram 1993, Fearon 1999) . However, it is not clear how this would affect radical parties, most of which lack considerable experience in government.
In Schlozman and Verba's (1979: 349) view, unemployment has very limited effects on the adoption of radical political positions by the public. This is consistent with the wider literature on non-mainstream parties, where a direct link between the electoral success of such parties and poor economic conditions has not been clearly established.
Findings regarding radical right parties are mixed, with some studies showing a strong positive association between bad economic conditions and radical right success (e.g. Arzheimer 2009; Jackman and Volpert 1996) and many others showing either a negative or a non-significant relationship (e.g. Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Coffé, Heyndels and Vermeir 2007; Eatwell 2000; Jesuit and Mahler 2004; Knigge 1998). 2 Similarly, although the literature about Green parties is much sparser, it has generally been suggested that their electoral support is not positively affected by bad economic conditions either (Müller-Rommel 1998) . Regarding specifically RLPs, the evidence using individual-level data is virtually non-existent, but March and Rommerskirchen (2015) found, using aggregate data for the period [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , that unemployment had a significant and positive effect on the radical left's vote share, although other economic variables such as GDP did not. Also using aggregate data, Hernández and Kriesi (2015) found that the new parties of the populist radical left (and right) benefitted electorally in those countries that were hit hardest by the Great Recession.
From a theoretical perspective, there are good reasons to think RLPs may directly benefit from bad economic conditions. Unlike radical right and Green parties, which tend to focus on non-economic issues (Mudde, 2007; Wagner 2012) , issues such as unemployment and redistribution play a central role in the discourse of the radical left, even for those parties that have adopted a new left agenda based on socio-culturalcosmopolitan/libertarian values (Gomez et al. 2016) . Not only do RLPs emphasize economic issues significantly more than any other party (Rovny 2012 ), but they also adopt more extreme positions than their mainstream counterparts -a strategy that helps smaller parties enjoy the benefits of policy differentiation and issue ownership (Wagner 2012) . While economic policy competence may be argued to disadvantage parties that lack enough government experience, that does not mean such parties cannot benefit from issue ownership at all. Issue ownership is also a matter of appearing more 'sincere and committed' than other parties to doing something about a particular issue (Petrocik 1996: 826) . Parties can therefore be associated with certain economic issues regardless of whether other parties are perceived to be more economically competent, and this has been shown to benefit parties electorally when the issue that they are associated with becomes more salient (Walgrave et al. 2012; Lachat 2014) .
Given that the salience of economic issues rises significantly with unemployment (Singer 2011) , it is easy to see how RLPs, which emphasize economic concerns so strongly, may particularly benefit from a bad economy. Indeed, certain groups of voters may find the radical left's strong and longstanding interest in unemployment, inequality and redistribution to be particularly attractive at a time when jobs are being lost. Higher unemployment rates will, therefore, draw more voters towards RLPs than it is the case under good economic conditions. 3 We may then expect that:
H1: Radical left parties will benefit from poor economic performance, particularly rising levels of unemployment So far, we have set out the reasons why we believe higher unemployment might lead more voters to support RLPs. However, it is possible that unemployment per se is not strong enough a reason to throw voters into the arms of the radical left. Many scholars have pointed out that the effect of the economy on the vote is contingent, and that it can be moderated or strengthened by several contextual (political and institutional) and individual factors (Powell and Whitten 1995; Bengtsson 2004 ; van der Brug et al. If we follow this logic, it will imply that bad economic conditions favor RLPs by enabling them to attract voters with a radical left-wing ideology who, for any reason, may not vote for them under different circumstances. However, the argument that voters with more extreme ideological positions are more strongly influenced by economic conditions seems a bit puzzling, as it is less ideological individuals who have been found to be less electorally anchored and more open to changing their vote than those with extreme positions (Duch et al. 2000) . Similarly, the effect of shortterm factors, and particularly the state of the economy, has been shown to be stronger for centrist voters and those with weaker party attachments (Kayser and Wlezien 2011; Torcal 2014 ).
Admittedly, the radical left's electorate is usually a strongly ideological one, placed around the extreme of the left-right continuum, which means that left-wing ideological radicalism plays an important role in fostering support for RLPs (Ramiro 2016 If rising unemployment is particularly important for the prospective voters of leftwing parties as a whole, a situation of increased unemployment might then be more favorable to the radical left when it is combined with a mainstream left-wing (social democratic) incumbent. In such a scenario, voters who supported the incumbent party in the past may feel both compelled to punish it and to look to its left for an alternative. On the contrary, supporting a (usually larger) party of the mainstream left could prove more effective in ousting a right-wing government that is perceived as responsible for a bad economy, which may potentially reduce support for RLPs.
Consequently, we can hypothesize that:
H3. Support for RLPs will increase with higher unemployment when a Social Democratic party is in office, but decrease otherwise.
In sum, following previous scholarship on the electoral effects of the economy, we aim to analyze whether economic factors, and particularly unemployment, influence the vote for European RLPs and, if so, under which specific political circumstances.
We will also test whether economic factors have a stronger effect for particular groups of voters across the ideological spectrum.
Data and methods

Our analyses combine national election surveys included in the Comparative Study of
Electoral Systems (2015a Systems ( , 2015b Systems ( , 2015c Systems ( , 2016 project (waves 1-4), aggregate economic indicators and data on government composition. 6 The CSES data cover elections held between 1996 and 2016, but some of the elections taking place during the last financial crisis are missing. We therefore added another six post-2007 national election surveys (Denmark 2011; Italy 2008 and 2013; and Spain 2011 and Spain , 2015 and Spain and 2016 on the grounds that they were publicly accessible and contained batteries of questions that were compatible with CSES modules. 7 This enabled us to work with a total number of 56 elections across 15 different countries (see Table 1 Table 1 . Countries and elections included in the sample. 1996 , 2002 , 2006 , 2010 , 2013 Denmark 2007 Finland 2003 France 2007 Germany 1998 , 2002 , 2005 , 2013 Greece 2009 Iceland 1999 , 2003 , 2013 Ireland 2002 Italy 2006 , 2008 , 2013 Netherlands 1998 , 2002 , 2006 , 2010 Norway 1997 , 2001 , 2005 , 2013 Portugal 2002 , 2005 Spain 1996 , 2004 , 2016 Sweden 1998 , 2002 , 2006 Switzerland 1999 , 2003 Our dependent variable is dichotomous and measures whether respondents voted for a radical left party (1) or not (0) in the most recent national legislative election. Regarding the independent variables, government composition is measured by a dichotomous variable indicating whether the Social Democrats were in office (1) or not (0) before the election. We also introduced an additional control indicating whether a RLP was in office (1) or not (0). Unemployment and economic growth (the latter is introduced as a control) are both measured at the election quarter and extracted from Eurostat (2015) and OECD (2015) Table 2 presents the result of a number of multilevel models where aggregate unemployment rates were introduced as independent variable. As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable is voting for a RLP in the most recent general election (individuals who voted for the radical left take up value 1, and those who did not take up value 0). Our first hypothesis (H1) expects higher unemployment rates to increase the probability to vote for RLPs. We have also introduced economic growth as a 13 Models were estimated using second-order PQL RIGLS in MlWin (Rasbash et al. 2017) . To check the robustness of results, final models were re-estimated using Bayesian modelling, which is computationally intensive but has been shown to be more robust and less prone to bias when applied to multilevel models, even with small numbers of higher-level units (Stegmueller 2013) . No substantial differences arose.
Country Election year
Czech Republic
Results
control in some of the models to make sure effects of unemployment are not due to other factors associated with economic growth in general.
Before we focus on the independent variables of interest, it is worth briefly commenting on the results of the individual-level controls (Table 2 , Model 1). As expected from previous literature (e.g. Ramiro 2016), the probability to vote for the radical left decreases significantly with age and increases with education. Men and women are, however, similarly likely to vote for this party family. The probability to support a RLP is significantly higher among union members, manual workers and public sector employees. Students and retired voters are somewhat more likely than employed voters to vote for RLPs, whereas voters who are outside the labour force (mainly homemakers, because job seekers are not included in this category) are less likely to do so. As expected, the effect of ideology is very strong indeed: the probability to vote for the radical left increases by more than 37 percentage points for voters with a left-wing ideology (0-2 on the 11-point left-right scale), and by 18 points for those with a centre-left ideology (3-4 on the 11-point left-right scale).
Interestingly, the radical left is also able to attract non-ideological voters, which are defined as those who are unable to place themselves on the left-right scale. While non-ideological voters are less likely to vote for RLPs than both left and centre-left voters, they are about 4.7 points more likely to do so than centre and centre-right voters. Finally, it is worth noting that unemployed voters are significantly more likely than their employed counterparts to vote for RLPs. Although the effect is not extremely large (unemployed voters are 2.8 percentage points more likely than employed voters to vote for the radical left), it is consistent with pocketbook voting theory. Moreover, the models control for unemployment rates, so this is capturing the effect of being unemployed regardless of whether unemployment levels are high or low when the election takes place. As can also be seen in Table 2 , our first hypothesis finds strong support in the data.
Unemployment rates are positively associated with a higher probability to support a RLP (models 1 and 2).
14 These findings are consistent with previous research using aggregate data (e.g. March and Rommerskirchen 2015) . Drawing on estimates from model 1, Figure 1 shows how the probability to vote for a RLP increases with unemployment. Based on our data, support for RLPs raises from 5.3% when 14 Controlling for whether the Social Democrats and the Radical Left are in office does not change results.
unemployment is low (2%, which is the sample minimum) to 22.8% when unemployment is high (24%, which is the sample maximum). It is important to note that the effect of unemployment is not driven by any particular election: results did not change substantially when we re-estimated the models eliminating the influence of one election at a time. 15 Contrary to our expectations, when we control for economic growth this variable seems to have a small positive effect on voting for RLPs; however, the statistical significance of the coefficient is not high enough (model 2).
16 Figure 1 . Effect of unemployment rates on the probability to vote for a RLP (average marginal effects) with 95% confidence intervals. 15 An examination of the dfbetas showed the most influential elections were Greece 2012 (where the radical left was exceptionally successful even for the high levels unemployment) and Spain 2011 (where the radical left got modest results in spite of high unemployment). But, as mentioned, the coefficient for unemployment was still significant (p<0.05 or less) after the individual exclusion of one election at a time. We also checked whether results change substantially after dropping all cases whose exclusion changes the coefficient for unemployment by 10% of more (i.e. Greece 2012; Spain 2004 Spain , 2011 Spain , 2015 and Italy 2013) , but they do not (results are available on request). 16 The effect is not significant either when growth is introduced on its own. As results do not change much when economic growth is controlled for, this variable has not been included in any of the subsequent models for the sake of parsimony. negative values mean the opposite. As can be seen (model 3), the impact of crosscountry differences in unemployment is not statistically different from zero. This stands in stark contrast with cross-election changes in unemployment, which have a positive and statistically significant effect on voting for RLPs, suggesting that it is increases in unemployment across elections and not structural differences between countries that are likely to lead to a higher probability to vote for the radical left.
17
Moving on to Hypothesis 2, the effect of unemployment might not work in the same way for all types of voters. While certain groups of voters may support the radical left regardless of the state of the economy, others may only feel tempted (or mobilised) to do so under conditions of economic stress. Given that different theoretical mechanisms could be at play, three versions of H2 were developed to test whether unemployment affects voters with more extreme left-wing views (H2a) or less ideological voters (H2b) more strongly. Alternatively, unemployment could be expected to have a similar effect on voters regardless of their ideology (H2c). To test these hypotheses, we introduced interactions between unemployment rates and ideology (Models 5-7, Table 3 ). As the effect of ideology varies across both countries and elections, random slopes at both levels were introduced as well. 18 To facilitate model comparison, we also provide the results of a baseline model (Model 4 in Table   3 ) including all the variables used in subsequent models but no interactions. We start out by testing H2a, for which an interaction between left-wing ideology and unemployment was introduced. As can be seen (Table 3, Unemployment increases the probability to vote for the radical left but, consistently with H2c, it does not enable RLPs to be nearly as attractive for centre-left and nonideological voters as they are for left-wing voters. This is because the attribution of responsibilities works differently depending on who is in power. When unemployment is high and the mainstream left is in office, voters may decide to punish the government by switching to a challenger left-wing party.
This logic may, however, not be at play when the Social Democrats are in opposition and, therefore, cannot be blamed for a bad economy. To test this hypothesis, model 8 in Table 3 introduces an interaction between unemployment and a binary variable indicating whether the Social Democrats were in office or not before the election. We also control, with another binary variable, for whether the radical left was in office.
As can be seen, unemployment does not significantly interact with type of government, suggesting that the radical left benefits from higher unemployment regardless of whether there is a left-wing or a right-wing government. The coefficient measuring whether the radical left was in office previously to the election is not statistically significant -and neither does it interact with unemployment (not shown).
Therefore, results provide extremely weak support for H3.
Conclusion
The question that guided this article was: to what extent, and how, do economic conditions drive support for RLPs? We argued that, unlike other mainstream parties such as the radical right or the greens, RLPs' very strong emphasis on socio-economic issues is likely to increase their appeal when economic concerns become more salient for voters. A scenario of rising unemployment is, therefore, expected to particularly benefit the radical left. Overall, we find strong support for this hypothesis. In those European democracies where a radical left option is present, unemployment is associated with a higher probability to vote for these parties. Using data from 56 elections in 15 European countries, we find that the radical left's support increases by about 17 percentage points when unemployment moves from 2% (sample minimum) to 24% (sample maximum). While economic growth did not seem to have an effect on its own, unemployment clearly did. Our results confirm previous findings in the literature that had used aggregate data regarding the positive effect of higher unemployment rates on the support for radical left in Europe (March and Rommerskirchen 2015; Hernández and Kriesi 2015) . Moreover, the effect of unemployment does not seem to be associated with cross-country differences but with changes in unemployment rates across elections. Importantly, this effect adds up to the egotropic effect of being unemployed, which increases the probability to vote for the radical left by 3 percentage points among those who do not have a job. 
